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Showing posts from 2007

Lincoln's Walk

In September 2007 my wife, Ginny, and I took a “busman’s holiday” to Richmond, Virginia. Our plan was to trace Lincoln’s 1865 visit to Richmond and to travel the route of V Corps, Army of the Potomac, from Petersburg to Appomattox Court House. Let me discuss the Richmond visit first. James W. Loewen in his splendid book, Lies Across America: What Our Historic Sites Get Wrong (Simon & Schuster: New York), 1999, describes President Lincoln’s walking tour of Richmond, Virginia, 4 April 1865 (pp. 310-317). Five days later, General Lee would surrender at Appomattox Court House. Ten days after his walk, President Lincoln would be dead from assassination. Loewen provides a detailed account of the walk including a map, which we used to re-trace Lincoln’s steps (p. 311). In his book Loewen also noted that there were no historical markers indicating the landing site on the James River or the walk itself. Moreover, he was unable to find a brochure or a map that gave a self-guided tour of

Does the Munich Analogy Fit?

My essay below, “Does the Munich Analogy Fit?”, was published in the online journal History News Network on 3 March 2003 (http://hnn.us/articles/1286.html/). Analogies appear frequently in historical writing. Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl in their helpful book The Philosopher’s Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods (Blackwell: Oxford), 2003, point out that analogies are also used by philosophers, lawyers, and journalists to enhance reasoning, to make arguments, and as illustrations. Analogies are, according to Baggini and Fosl, “strong” if they “share a large or decisive number of relevant similarities” while at the same time they “do not exhibit a large or decisive number of relevant differences” (p. 47). To the extent that an analogy does not satisfactorily fit those two conditions, then the analogy is “weak”. The essay below discusses some of the difficulties of using analogies in historical arguments. “Does the Munich Analogy Fit?” By Robert Cook Recent wo

The Unknowable

On 23 February 1991 VII Corps crowded against the Iraq border. At that time, it was the largest United States Army Corps ever deployed in the field. VII Corps included 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Armor Division, 3rd Armor Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade, and hundreds of combat and combat support units. In round numbers, VII Corps had over 1,500 M1A/2 Abrams tanks, over 1,500 M2/M3 IFV (Bradleys), over 300 attack helicopters, over 600 artillery cannons and MLRS’, and over 147,000 soldiers. It had taken only 108 days to move this august force from Europe and the United States to the border of Iraq and ready it for battle. VII Corps was not alone. Left and right the entire might of the coalition forces were coiled for the attack. The United States Army XVIII Corps. The British 1st Armored Division. The French 6th Light Armored Division. The 1st United States Marine Corps Division. The 2nd United States Marine Corps
Operation Desert Storm, 1991 On 21 February 1991 I was the Commander of the 326th Military History Detachment (USAR) attached to VII Corps and assigned for operational purposes to 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Brigade, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor configured for the operation as TASK FORCE 2-34. The ground war would begin in three days. My mission was to support the Department of Army’s combat oral history program (in accordance with AR 870-5; FM 101-10-2, Ch 15; DA PAM 870-5; and FONCON, 7 Dec 90, William Stacy, FORSCOM historian). In other words I was to design and execute rigorous oral history collection projects, supplemented by photographs, documents and personal notes as possible, that would capture the individual recollections, and unit histories of supporting and engaged Army units. Over the next several days I will share with you some of my personal and professional experiences as an Army field historian commanding a Military History Detachment during Operation DESERT S